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LIESBETH TODTS1
The Legitimacy of Area-Based Restrictions to Maintain Public 
Order…: Giving Content to the Proportionality Principle from 
a European Legal Perspective 
1. Introduction
The Belgian and UK legislators provide the executive and the judge with 
increasing powers to maintain public order that restrict the freedom of 
movement of the individual. In Belgium, the maintenance of public order 
is primarily a competence of local administrative authorities, in particular 
the mayor. For example, a new Article 134sexies has been inserted in the 
Belgian New Municipality Act (NMA) which gives mayors the power to 
maintain public order by imposing a so-called “temporary prohibition of 
place”2. On this ground, a mayor can, in case of a public order disturbance 
or nuisance, prohibit the offender to enter a certain public place for up to 
one month3. 
Similar police powers were introduced in the United Kingdom by Part 3 
of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (ACPA). This 
part provides constables in uniform with dispersal powers, enabling them 
to impose a “direction to leave” on a person who has engaged in, or is likely 
to engage in, problematic behaviour (i.e. anti-social behaviour, crime or 
disorder) in a  certain public area4. This direction to leave comprises – 
1 Liesbeth Todts, PhD Candidate in Administrative Law at the University of Ant-
werp (Belgium), Faculty of Law, research group Government & Law.
2 is prohibition of place was already known in administrative law, but has been 
enshrined generally in a statutory text for the rst time now. For a rst analysis of this 
new temporary prohibition of place and its conditions, see, e.g. L. Todts, Het gemeen-
telijk plaatsverbod: een eerste verkenning en toetsing aan het fundamentele recht op per-
soonlijke bewegingsvrijheid (e municipal prohibition of place: a rst exploratory anal-
ysis and review of its compatibility with the fundamental right to freedom of movement) 
(2015) 8 Tijdschri voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiek Recht 432.
3 Art. 134sexies, § 2 NMA.
4 Similar police powers already existed under the 2003 Anti-social Behaviour Act 
(Part 4). However, the conditions of the new direction to leave are even less stringent, 
thus implying increased police discretion. For a brief comparison of the old and new 
dispersal powers, see, e.g. A. Millie, Replacing the ASBO: An opportunity to stem the ow 
into the Criminal Justice System [in:] e Penal Landscape: e Howard League Guide 
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besides the obligation to leave the area as such – the obligation not to return 
to that place, thus excluding the offender from that area5. However, the 
exclusion can only be applied for up to 48 hours, in contrast to one month 
in the case of the Belgian prohibition of place. It is important to note that 
the direction to leave obligates the offender to leave the locality and not 
to return to it, in contrast to the Belgian prohibition of place which only 
refers to the prohibition to enter the locality. Despite this difference, both 
measures have the same goal, namely maintaining public order by imposing 
area-based restrictions, in other words by prohibiting an individual to be in 
a certain public place for a certain period.
The above-mentioned techniques are not the only area-based restric-
tions that can be imposed in order to maintain public order. For instance, in 
Belgium and the United Kingdom, public officials or the judge, respective-
ly, can impose on the individual a temporary prohibition to enter a football 
stadium in order to tackle football-related violence and disorder6. In both 
legal systems, the freedom of movement can also be limited with the aim 
of maintaining public order by a public transport ban imposed by civil ser- 
vants or by the judge comprising the prohibition to use public transport7.
The above trend of increased public order powers that restrict the 
individual in his or her free movement is unlikely to end soon. After all, 
at present, there is an increase in dangerous situations and situations of 
threat, such as terror threat, which might lead to an increase in public order 
powers. Moreover, the powers of judges and the executive to safeguard 
public order are not listed anywhere in a  limited way so new forms of 
public order powers may be introduced. For instance, in Belgium, the 
introduction of the electronic tag is debated, imposed by the executive 
in order to fight radicalisation8. Similar freedom-restricting measures 
imposed in the fight against terrorism already exist in the United Kingdom. 
to Criminal Justice in England and Wales, A. Dockley, I. Loader (eds.), Routledge 2013, 
p. 79–81.
5 S.35(1) ACPA.
6 Art. 24 Wet 21 December 1998 betreende de veiligheid bij voetbalwedstrijden 
(Belgian Security at Football Matches Act 1998) and Art. 14B Football Spectators Act 
1989 (the so-called football banning order on complaint), resp.
7 Decreet 8 mei 2009 betreende toegangsverbod tot voertuigen van de VVM 
(Flemish Transport Ban Decree 2009) and Part 1 ACPA, resp. It is important to point 
out that in the United Kingdom the maintenance of public order is primarily a compe-
tence of judges and not the (local) executive, which is – as mentioned above – the case 
in Belgium. However, this does not mean that judges in Belgium cannot impose public 
order solutions at all. For instance, in Belgium, a criminal judge can impose a judicial 
football stadium ban for football-related violence. Conversely, in the United Kingdom, 
public order solutions can also be imposed by the executive. e above-mentioned 
direction to leave, for example, is imposed by the executive, more specically by a con-
stable in uniform.
8 Hand, Kamer 2015-16, December 2, 2015, No. 7807, p. 26–27.
130
The Legitimacy of Area-Based Restrictions to Maintain Public Order… RAP 2017 (3)
For example, the Secretary of State can impose the so-called “non-
derogating control orders”9 which have recently been replaced by errorism 
prevention and investigation measures or “TPIMs”10. These measures can 
contain exclusions from particular areas, with the possibility to monitor 
these exclusions via electronic tagging11.
However, the above-mentioned public order powers constitute serious 
restrictions of our fundamental rights and freedoms, more specifically the 
right to freedom of movement as guaranteed in, inter alia, Article 2 of the 
Fourth Additional Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(FAP)12. This Article reads as follows: 
“1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, 
have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. 
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. 
3. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such 
as are in accordance with law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security or public safety, for the maintenance of public 
order, for the prevention of crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
4. The rights set forth in paragraph 1 may also be subject, in particular areas, to 
restrictions imposed in accordance with law and justified by the public interest 
in a democratic society”.
For this contribution, I will only focus on the individual’s right to move 
freely within the territory of a  particular State, as enshrined in the first 
paragraph of Article 2 of the FAP and not the right of the individual to 
choose his/her residence or the right to leave a country, as guaranteed in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Article13.
The right to move freely within the territory of a  particular State 
prohibits national authorities to restrict the individual’s free movement 
in an arbitrary way. In addition, every individual also has the right not 
to arbitrarily lose all freedom of movement and thus not to be arbitrarily 
9 e orders are called “non-derogating” since they do not derogate from Article 5 
of the ECHR: they merely restrict the individual in his or her free movement instead of 
depriving the individual of all liberty (see D. Feldman, Deprivation of liberty in anti-ter-
rorism law (2008) 67(1) C.L.J. 4, 4).
10 Sections 2 and 3 (1)(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, as repealed in 
2011 by Section 1 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.
11 Section 3(3); Schedule 1, Part 1, Section 3 and Section 29(1), resp. of the Terror-
ism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.
12 See also Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 12 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
13 Consequently – and given the only limited scope of this contribution – I will 
only focus on purely internal situations and neither the right to free movement between 
dierent EU States, as protected under EU law, nor the right to free movement of aliens 
in the context of migration law, will be profoundly discussed either.
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deprived of his or her liberty, as guaranteed in the right to liberty and security 
anchored in, inter alia, Article 5 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR)14. Thus, restraints of the individual’s free movement can 
occur in various degrees, ranging from a  mere restriction upon the free 
movement under Article 2 of the FAP to a more far-reaching deprivation 
of all liberty under Article 5 of the ECHR. As to area-based restrictions, 
they are generally considered to be mere limitations of the individual’s free 
movement without depriving the individual of all liberty15. Consequently, 
this contribution focuses on Article 2 of the FAP and not on Article 5 of 
the ECHR.
It is important to point out that, according to the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECofHR) case law, the right to liberty of movement in 
Article of the 2 FAP must be clearly distinguished from the right to liberty 
and security in Article 5 of the ECHR. In Austin16, the Strasbourg-based 
Court stated that the rights guaranteed under the ECHR – which are 
incorporated into UK domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998 via 
the so-called Convention rights – and more specifically the right to liberty 
and security in Article 5 – may not be interpreted as (also) providing the 
requirements of the Fourth Additional Protocol as regards Contracting 
States to the ECHR who have not yet ratified this protocol17, such as the 
United Kingdom18. Thus, UK citizens cannot bring claims for breaches of 
Article 2 of the FAP before national courts, since the United Kingdom has 
not ratified the Fourth Additional Protocol. In Belgium, on the contrary, 
an individual can bring a claim to a national court for breaches of Article 
2 of the FAP itself, since Belgium did ratify the Fourth Additional Protocol 
which has direct effect in domestic law.
The freedom of movement is not only a fundamental right as such. It is also 
a fundamental precondition for the enjoyment of many other fundamental 
rights19. In this regard, the ECofHR has already held that restrictions of the 
14 See also Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 9 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
15 See, e.g. Landvreugd v the Netherlands (2003) 36 E.H.R.R. 56 and Olivieira v the 
Netherlands (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 32; 14 B.H.R.C. 96. Cf. Van den Dungen v e Nether-
lands (App. No. 22838/93), Admissibility decision of 22 February 1995, Decisions and 
Reports 1995-80A, p. 147–151. is has also been already conrmed by the Belgian 
Constitutional Court as regards the Belgian temporary prohibition of place (GwH 
April 23, 2015, No. 44/2015, para. B.62).
16 Austin and others v United Kingdom (2012) 55 E.H.R.R. 14.
17 Ibid., para. 55.
18 However, it did sign it, so that the United Kingdom may not act contradictory to 
the object and the aim of the Protocol (Article 18 of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 
1969 on the Law of Treaties). 
19 According to the Human Rights Committee, the right to freedom of move-
ment is an indispensable condition for the free development of a person (U.N. Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev 1/Add.9 (1999)).
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right to freedom of movement may also interfere with other fundamental 
rights, such as the right to privacy in Article 8 of the ECHR20. Hence, UK 
citizens can bring claims before national courts for breaches of the right to 
freedom of movement based on other Convention rights, such as the right 
to privacy, but also, for example, the right to freedom of expression and the 
right to freedom of assembly and association as enshrined in Articles 10 
and 11 of the ECHR, respectively, provided that the limitations on the free 
movement amount to limitations on any of these rights.
The question arises under what conditions measures imposed by 
national authorities to maintain public order restricting the individual’s 
free movement within the territory of that State are compatible with the 
aforementioned fundamental rights and freedoms. This question is not 
an easy one to answer. After all, there is no clear and general assessment 
framework for such freedom-restricting public order powers, in particular 
at European human rights level. However, such a framework is essential to 
strike a good balance between the need to maintain public order and the 
protection of our fundamental rights and freedoms, especially the right to 
freedom of movement.
The lack of such a  clear and general assessment framework at the 
European human rights level has two main causes. First, as discussed 
above, national authorities may not only have to take into account the 
requirements of Article 2 of the FAP but also of other fundamental rights, 
such as Articles 8, 10 and 11 of the ECHR as restrictions upon the free 
movement may interfere with these rights as well. To be in accordance 
with the right to freedom of movement – as guaranteed in Article 2 of the 
FAP or via other fundamental rights – the imposed measure must meet 
the standard restriction requirements as set by Article 2(3) of the FAP and 
Articles 8(2), 10(2) and 11(2) of the ECHR, respectively. These are, first, that 
the restriction must be “prescribed by law”, i.e. having a basis in national 
law. Second, it must pursue a  “legitimate aim”, such as the maintenance 
of public order. Third, the restriction must be “necessary in a democratic 
society”. To assess this necessity, the ECofHR has developed a  number 
of criteria, including the condition that the restriction must respond to 
a “pressing social need” and that it must be “proportionate”.
It is important to note that Article 2 of the FAP contains another 
ground for restriction in the fourth paragraph. This restriction ground – 
although only applicable in particular geographical areas – such as areas 
with a  lot of drug trafficking21 – already enables national authorities to 
restrict the freedom of movement when it is “justified by the public interest 
20 Iletmiş v Turkey (2011) 52 E.H.R.R. 35.
21 Article 2(4) FAP. See, e.g. Landvreugd v the Netherlands (2003) 36 E.H.R.R. 56 
and Olivieira v the Netherlands (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 32; 14 B.H.R.C. 96.
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in a democratic society”22. This seems to be less strict than the standard 
formula of “necessary in a democratic society” in the third paragraph. In 
this case, the measure does not have to respond to a “pressing social need”; 
it suffices that it is “not disproportionate”23. As a result, and regardless of 
whether the restriction ground in the third or fourth paragraph is applied, 
the measure must always be at least “proportionate”24.
To date, only a  small amount of the case law of the ECofHR exists 
on the compatibility of freedom-restricting public order powers with 
our fundamental rights and freedoms, especially the right to freedom 
of movement, so that the ECofHR’s case law is of only  limited  help for 
establishing a  clear and general assessment framework. That freedom-
restricting public order powers, such as area-based restrictions, find 
a  sufficient basis in the law and have a  legitimate aim is not generally 
questioned25. The Belgian prohibition of place and the UK direction to 
leave both have a basis in national law26. In addition, given the fact that 
the legitimate aims mentioned in Article 2 of the FAP as well as Articles 
8, 10 and 11 of the ECHR are interpreted broadly by the ECofHR27, it can 
be assumed that both area-based restrictions pursue a  legitimate aim, 
namely the maintenance of public order. After all, the prohibition of place 
and the direction to leave are imposed to tackle “public order disturbance 
and nuisance” and “anti-social behaviour, crime and disorder”, respectively28. 
Therefore, the decisive criterion will be the requirement of being “necessary 
22 e fourth paragraph was introduced to enable restrictions that, although serv-
ing the general interest, do not necessarily require a situation in which there is a distur-
bance of public order as well (B. Vermeulen, Chapter 21. e Right to Liberty of Move-
ment (Article 2 of Protocol No. 4) [in:] P. Van Dijk, F. Van Hoof, A. Van Rijn, L. Zwaak 
(eds.), eory and practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, Intersentia 
2006, p. 944). 
23 See, e.g. Landvreugd, fn. 22 above, para. 74 and and Olivieira, fn. 22 above, 
para. 65.
24 J. Schilder, J. Brouwer, Recht op bewegingsvrijheid, kenbaarheidseis en voorzien-
baarheidseis (e right to freedom of movement and the requirements of accessibility 
and foreseeability) (2003) 15 AB Rechtspraak Bestuursrecht 16 and Ch. Grabenwarter, 
European Convention on Human Rights. Commentary, Beck 2014, p. 415.
25 N. Arenas Hidalgo, Liberty of Movement Within the Territory of a State (Article 
2 of Additional Protocol No. 4 ECHR) [in:] Europe of Rights: A Compendium on the Eu-
ropean Convention of Human Right, J. García Roca, P. Santolaya (eds.), Koninklijke Brill 
2012, p. 622–623 and the references to the case law there.
26 I.e. the NMA (Article 134sexies) and the ACPA (part 3) for the prohibition of 
place and the direction to leave, respectively. is has already been conrmed by the 
Belgian Constitutional Court as regards the Belgian prohibition of place (see GwH 
April 23, 2015, No. 44/2015, paras. B.60.6-B.60.9).
27 J. Gerards, EVRM: Algemene beginselen (ECHR: General principles), Sdu Uit-
gevers 2011, p. 133.
28 at the Belgian prohibition of place pursues a legitimate aim (the aim of public 
order) has already been conrmed by the Belgian Constitutional Court (GwH April 23, 
2015, No. 44/2015, para. B.60.7).
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(or justified, according to Article 2(4) of the FAP) in a democratic society”, 
or, in other words, being proportionate. 
However, this proportionality requirement seems not to be the only one 
applicable to freedom-restricting public order powers under the Conven-
tion. That brings me to the second problem as to the assessment framework 
at the European human rights level. As will be shown below, another pro-
portionality test seems to result at least implicitly from the ECofHR’s case 
law with regard to the right to a court with full jurisdiction in Article 6 of 
the ECHR, provided that the measure imposed is to be considered as civil 
or criminal within the meaning of that Article.
As a result, the compatibility of freedom-restricting public order powers 
with our fundamental rights and freedoms is not a  single and distinct 
problem, only relating to Article 2 of the FAP, especially not as regards 
the proportionality of such powers. These powers may also interfere with 
several other fundamental rights, such as Articles 8, 10 and 11 of the 
ECHR, but also Article 6 of the ECHR. The compatibility of these powers is 
thus a multi-faceted problem, relating to multiple fundamental rights and 
thus with several conditions that must be met, in particular with regard to 
the proportionality principle. 
It is undisputable that the proportionality principle is applicable to 
freedom-restricting public order powers, such as area-based restrictions. 
Although neither the text of the Convention nor its Additional Protocols 
expressly refers to the proportionality principle, it is identified in the 
ECofHR’s case law as a general principle of the Convention: it is “inherent in 
the whole of the Convention” and requires the ECofHR to search for “a fair 
balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and 
the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental right”29. 
In Belgium, the proportionality principle is a part of the unwritten general 
“principles of good administration” which the executive must take into 
account. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the proportionality 
principle is relatively new. It was incorporated into UK domestic law by the 
Human Rights Act 1998 via the Convention rights and only qualified as 
a general principle of public law in 200130. 
The question arises how this proportionality principle must be inter-
preted and what the content of this principle is as regards freedom-restrict-
ing public order powers, such as area-based restrictions. This is especially 
true given the fact that such measures may interfere with various funda-
29 Soering v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439, para. 89. See also, amongst others Baumann v 
France (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 44, para. 61; Hajlik v Hungary (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 11, para. 32; 
Stamose v Bulgaria (App. No. 29713/05), judgement of November 27, 2012, para. 32 and 
Soltysyak v Russia (2016) 62 E.H.R.R. 5, para. 48.
30 Daly v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 
2 A.C. 532. See also T. Hickman, e substance and structure of proportionality (2008) 
P.L. 694, 694.
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mental rights, with various (proportionality) requirements that must be 
met, as discussed above. The aim of this contribution is thus to provide 
a first exploratory analysis of the criteria that must be taken into account 
by national authorities when imposing area-based restrictions, or by judges 
when assessing their legitimacy, for these measures to be proportionate and 
thus compliant with our fundamental rights and freedoms, in particular 
the right to freedom of movement. 
Therefore, this contribution first focuses on identifying the nature of 
area-based restrictions, especially whether and to what extent they are 
civil and/or criminal for the purposes of Article 6 of the ECHR. Given the 
fact that today we have to comprehend the principle of proportionality 
primarily because it is part and parcel of the case law of the European 
Court of Justice and the ECofHR, the contribution then offers a  very 
brief overview of the content of this principle as conceived of by these 
Courts before comparing it with the content of this principle at national 
level, more specifically Belgium and the United Kingdom. The domestic 
case law can offer leads as regards criteria that must be taken into account 
when considering the proportionality of freedom-restricting measures in 
the absence of a clear and general assessment framework at the European 
human rights level. The contribution first analyses whether and to what 
extent this interpretation has been implemented by the Belgian Council 
of State (this is the highest general administrative court in Belgium). The 
case law of the Council of State is an interesting case to examine since the 
Council applies a  different proportionality test depending on the legal 
classification of the measure imposed. This is then followed by an analysis 
of the proportionality principle in UK case law31. The proportionality 
principle is a relative newcomer in the UK used instead of the traditional 
“Wednesbury unreasonableness” test32 in cases that fall under the ECHR33. 
The contribution ends with some concluding remarks.
2. The nature of area-based restrictions: civil, criminal or both?
In the ECofHR’s case law, a distinction is made based on Article 6(1) 
of the ECHR between measures which are punitive in purpose (the so-
called “criminal charges”) and those with a more preventive object. When 
considering whether the measure imposed is punitive or not for the purposes 
of Article 6, the ECofHR applies autonomous interpretation, involving 
a number of criteria of which the domestic legal classification is the starting 
31 References in this contribution to the United Kingdom should be read as com-
prising (only) England and Wales.
32 A. Davies, J. Williams, Proportionality in English Law [in:] e Judge and the Pro-
portionate Use of Discretion, S. Ranchordás, B. de Waard (eds.), Routledge 2015, p. 73.
33 A.D.P. Brady, Proportionality and Deference Under the UK Human Rights Act: 
An Institutionally Sensitive Approach, CUP 2012, p. 6.
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point, though not the most decisive. More important is the nature of the 
measure, in particular whether or not the measure has a punitive purpose34. 
For instance, the area-based restrictions contested in Landvreugd and 
Olivieira35, both imposed to tackle the traffic in and the use of hard drugs in 
a public place, were treated as preventive and thus non-criminal measures, 
because they were imposed for the “maintenance of public order and the 
prevention of crime”36. This distinction is important. Only if the measure 
imposed is to be regarded as criminal within the meaning of Article 6, is the 
individual entitled to the procedural protections guaranteed in that Article, 
such as the right to a court with full jurisdiction. 
It is important to note that the above distinction is not the only one 
made in the ECofHR’s case law. After all, Article 6 of the ECHR is not only 
applicable to criminal matters, but also to measures involving the determi-
nation of a civil right or obligation, though certain procedural safeguards 
specified are only applicable to criminal matters. Whether or not the meas-
ure imposed involves the determination of a civil right or obligation is also 
interpreted autonomously by the ECofHR on the basis of a number of cri-
teria. Again, the domestic legal classification of the right concerned is not 
conclusive. According to the ECofHR’s case law, the content and effects of 
the right under the domestic law will be of particular importance37. One 
can wonder whether a measure restricting the right to freedom of move-
ment implies the determination of a civil right as well. To my knowledge, 
this question has not yet arisen before the ECofHR. However, in my opin-
ion, this might be possible, especially when the freedom-restricting meas-
ure has repercussions on other, civil rights, such as the individual’s private 
life in Article 8 of the ECHR38.
The Belgian Council of State does not expressly refer to Article 6 of 
the ECHR to distinguish between public order powers with a punitive or 
criminal purpose and those which are more preventive. However, it does 
take into account the purpose of the measure contested. In Belgium, the 
purpose of the measure is important since it brings along a different legal 
classification of that measure. In general, two categories of public order 
powers are distinguished in Belgian administrative law, depending on their 
34 Lauko v Slovakia, Application 26138/95 (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 40, paras. 56–57; 
Öztürk v Germany, Series A No. 73 (1984) 6 E.H.R.R. 409, para. 50 and Engel and others 
v e Netherlands, Series A. No. 22 (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 647, para. 82.
35 Landvreugd, fn. 22 above and Olivieira, fn. 22 above.
36 Landvreugd, fn. 22 above, para. 68 and Olivieira, fn. 22 above, para. 61. As al-
ready pointed out by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in Secretary of State for the Home De-
partment v MB [2007] UKHL 46, para. 23.
37 See http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf (Accessed on 
27 July 2016), p. 6–13.
38 Cf. Alexandre v Portugal (App. No. 33197), judgement of 20 November 2012, pa-
ras. 51 and 54. See also http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf 
(Accessed on 27 July 2016), p. 11.
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purpose. First, public order powers can be imposed as an “administrative 
sanction”, which aims to punish the offender for the offences he or she 
committed, thus reacting to past actions. Second, these powers can also be 
imposed as an “administrative measure” (the so-called “police measure”), 
which is more preventive in nature and does not aim to punish the offender 
for past actions but to safeguard public order39. Therefore, it is not necessary 
that an offence has already been committed.
The Belgian legislator has clearly qualified the prohibition of place 
as a police measure since the prohibition is being imposed “to safeguard 
public order”40, without the necessity of an offence that has already been 
committed. Thus, the prohibition of place mainly aims to maintain public 
order instead of punishing the offender for past actions41. This legal 
classification was questioned before the Belgian Constitutional Court by 
the “Human Rights League” – this is a non-governmental organisation that 
aims to tackle injustices and any attack on the individual’s fundamental 
rights and freedoms – but the Court confirmed this classification42. 
However, this does not prevent the Council of State from deciding in 
a particular case that the contested prohibition of place is in reality imposed 
as an administrative sanction since it aims to hurt the offender for the 
infringements that he or she committed in a certain public area. Moreover, 
the imposed prohibition of place may be so punitive in nature that it 
must be regarded as a criminal charge, in line with the above-mentioned 
ECofHR’s case law. Merely preventive prohibitions of place are not likely 
to be regarded as criminal for the purposes of Article 6 of the ECHR since 
they are not punitive in nature. However, the prohibition of place does 
not need to be considered as criminal in order to fall within the ambit of 
Article 6. After all, it may be possible that the Council of State considers 
in a particular case that the imposed prohibition must be regarded as civil 
within the meaning of Article 6, as discussed above, thus coming within the 
scope of that Article.
Contrary to Belgium, the United Kingdom does not formally acknow- 
ledge the distinction between “administrative sanctions” and “preventive 
measures” with regard to the legal classification of public order powers, 
depending on the nature of the imposed technique43. In general, in the 
39 RvS 8 May 2014, No. 227.331, BVBA Wedwinkel, para. 20; RvS 15 May 2014, 
No. 227.421, BVBA Buka 2000, para. 7 and RvS 29 July 2014, No. 228.130, BVBA 
HS-Trading, para. 8. See also adv.RvS, Parl.St. Kamer 2012-13, No. 53-2712/001, p. 61–62.
40 Art. 134sexies, § 1 NMA.
41 See also Memorie van toelichting, Parl.St. Kamer 2012-13, No. 53-2712/001, 
p. 5 and 28.
42 GwH April 23, 2015, No. 44/2015, paras. B.57.7–B.57.8.
43 is does not mean that administrative sanctions do not exist in the United 
Kingdom; see, e.g. Part 3 of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, en-
abling regulatory bodies to impose administrative sanctions for regulatory breaches. 
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United Kingdom, techniques to tackle problematic behaviour are consi- 
dered to be civil orders, i.e. ones where the nature of the proceedings fol-
lowed by the competent authority is civil and not criminal since it is not 
necessary that a crime has been committed44. The new direction to leave, 
for instance, must be regarded as civil, since the imposition of it does not 
require a criminal offence45. Moreover, an offence is not even necessary at 
all. The direction to leave can already be imposed when problematic behav-
iour is likely to be committed, without the requirement of problematic be- 
haviour that has already been committed, criminal or not46. Consequently, 
the direction to leave can be regarded as a civil order with a more preventive 
purpose, primarily aiming at tackling future problematic behaviour instead 
of sanctioning an individual for past actions47. It is important to note, how-
ever, that this does not mean that the direction to leave cannot be imposed 
as a reaction to the individual’s past actions. After all, section 35(2) of the 
ACPA also refers to the possibility to impose the direction in attempts to 
tackle problematic behaviour to which the individual has already contributed.
However, this domestic legal classification as civil, i.e. not criminal, 
is not conclusive. It appears from UK case law that the domestic courts, 
referring to the ECofHR’s case law concerning Article 6 of the ECHR, 
increasingly take into account the nature of the measure imposed48 in 
order to appropriately classify that measure as criminal or not within the 
meaning of Article 649. Thus, the primarily civil, i.e. non-criminal, domestic 
legal classification of the direction to leave does not prevent the UK courts 
However, it is still a  developing eld and a  clear distinction between criminal and 
administrative sanctions has yet to emerge (see, e.g. J. McEldowney, Country analy-
sis – United Kingdom [in:] O. Jansen, Administrative Sanctions in the European Union, 
Intersentia 2013), p. 585). Nevertheless, given the fact that these administrative sanc-
tions are not primarily imposed to maintain public order as such, they fall outside the 
scope of this contribution.
44 Note that, in the United Kingdom, the notion “civil” is conceived of rather as 
“not criminal”, whereas in continental legal systems, such as Belgium, it is rather con-
ceived of as the opposite of “administrative”.
45 See Article 35(2) of the ACPA.
46 Ibid.
47 A. Crawford, Dispersal Powers and the Symbolic Role of Anti-Social Behaviour 
Legislation (2008) 71(5) MLR 753, p. 777. Although Crawford’s contribution relates 
to the old dispersal powers, the same reasoning can be applied to the new direction to 
leave since both orders can already be imposed when problematic behaviour is likely 
to be committed (s. 30(3) 2003 Act and s. 35(2) 2014 Act, resp.).
48 As already stated in Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] 
UKHL 46, para. 23.
49 For instance, the above-mentioned football banning orders on complaint 
(Gough and Smith v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2002] Q.B. 1213, para. 89) are con-
sidered to be non-criminal within the meaning of Article 6 of the ECHR. e same 
applies to the former non-derogating control orders (see Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46, para. 24).
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from considering in a particular case that the imposed direction must be 
regarded as a criminal charge, in line with the ECofHR’s case law. 
In addition, the UK courts must also take into account, in the light of 
Article 6, the distinction between civil and non-civil matters. The fact that 
the direction to leave is considered to be civil under domestic law is a starting 
point, but not conclusive, as discussed above. Nevertheless, it might be 
possible that the direction to leave must be regarded as civil within the 
meaning of Article 6 of the ECHR, especially when interfering with other, 
civil rights, such as the right to private life. This has already been confirmed 
in UK case law as to other freedom-restricting public order powers. In 
McCann, for instance, concerning the former anti-social behaviour orders 
and more specifically, amongst others, the order prohibiting the individual 
to be in a certain area for a certain period50, Lord Hope stated the following: 
“Although the jurisprudence of the ECofHR appears to me as yet to be 
unclear on this point, I would hold that the fact that prohibitions made 
under section 1(6) of [the Crime and Disorder Act 1998] may have this 
effect [i.e. interfering with, amongst others, the individual’s private life] is 
sufficient to attract the right to a fair trial which is guaranteed by Article 
6(1)” (emphasis added)51. 
As a result, as the above indicates, it is likely that freedom-restricting 
public order powers must be considered as civil within the meaning of 
Article 6 of the ECHR, especially when these powers interfere with other, 
civil rights, such as the right to private life in Article 8 of the ECHR. In 
other cases, though, these powers may be classified as (also) criminal for 
the purposes of Article 6 and not (only) civil.
3. The proportionality of area-based restrictions
3.1. The proportionality principle at European level
At European level, the European Court of Justice usually applies a strict 
structure when assessing whether the proportionality principle has been 
violated, consisting of the following three questions52:
50 Anti-social behaviour orders or ASBO’s were civil orders comprising certain 
prohibitions or obligations imposed by the court in order to stop problematic be-
haviour, such as the prohibition to return to a certain area. ey were introduced by 
the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and were superseded by the “Injunction” and the 
“criminal behaviour order”, both introduced by the ACPA 2014.
51 McCann v Crown Court at Manchester  [2002] UKHL 39;  [2003] 1 A.C. 787, 
para. 80. See, in the same sense, as to the former non-derogating control orders: Secre-
tary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46, para. 24 (Lord Bingham 
of Cornhill) cf., para. 79 (Lord Carswell).
52 See, e.g. R. Widdershoven, M. Remac, General principles of law in administrative 
law under European inuence (2012) European Review of Private Law 391–392 and 
C. Haguenau-Moizard, Y. Sanchez, e principle of proportionality in European law [in:] 
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 – Is the measure necessary to achieve the pursued legitimate aim?
 – Is the measure suitable and thus able to achieve the aim pursued? 
 – Is the measure proportionate in the strict sense? This means that the dis-
advantages caused by the measure to the interests of the individual(s) 
concerned must not be disproportionate to the aim pursued.
A similar proportionality review seems to be underlying the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights as well. When analysing the 
proportionality of measures restricting the individual’s fundamental rights, 
the ECofHR considers the following three criteria53:
 – The restriction must be necessary to attain the aim pursued;
 – The restriction must be relevant and sufficient and thus suitable in order 
to achieve the aim pursued; 
 – The restriction must be proportionate in the strict sense. This means that 
the severity of the restriction on the individual’s fundamental rights 
must stand in fair proportion to the importance of the legitimate aim 
pursued.
However, the content of the proportionality principle in the ECofHR’s 
case law is not always clear-cut because the ECofHR does not systematically 
apply these criteria in each case and even if the criteria are applied, they are 
hardly ever examined separately. In addition, these criteria also differ in their 
relative importance. With regard to freedom-restricting measures, neither 
the necessity nor the suitability criterion is often used when analysing the 
proportionality of that measure54. Therefore, it can be tentatively stated 
that these criteria seem to be of less importance. For instance, in the 
above-mentioned cases Landvreugd and Olivieira, the ECofHR referred 
to neither of the criteria. However, as to the necessity criterion, this can 
be explained by the fact that freedom-restricting measures are already 
possible when “justified in a democratic society”, according to the fourth 
paragraph of Article 2 of the FAP. This only requires the measure to be 
proportionate, without the necessity of responding to a pressing social need 
as well55. In Landvreugd and Olivieira, for example, the ECofHR applied 
the fourth paragraph of Article 2 of the FAP and it only assessed whether the 
S. Ranchordás, B. de Waard, e Judge…, p. 153–154 and the references to the case 
law there.
53 For a more extended discussion, see e.g. Gerards, EVRM: Algemene beginselen, 
fn. 28 above, p. 140–157; Y. Arai-Takahashi,  Proportionality [in:] e Oxford Hand-
book of International Human Rights Law, Dinah Shelton (ed.), OUP 2013, p. 451; Ja-
cobs, White and Ovey. e European Convention on Human Rights, B. Rainey, E. Wicks, 
C. Ovey (eds.), OUP, 2014, p. 324–325 and T. Harbo, e Function of Proportionality 
Analysis in European Law, Brill Nijho 2015, p. 71–80 and the references to the case 
law there.
54 Hidalgo, “Liberty of Movement Within the Territory of a  State”, fn. 26 above, 
p. 622.
55 See supra.
141
Liesbeth TodtsRAP 2017 (3)
restriction complained of was “not disproportionate”, without examining 
whether there was a “pressing social need” 56.
The most used criterion of the proportionality test in the ECofHR’s case 
law as to freedom-restricting measures is the requirement of proportiona- 
lity in the strict sense57. According to Hidalgo, the ECofHR has often lim-
ited its proportionality review to only this third element58. In Landvreugd, 
for example, the ECofHR refers to the third criterion – and only to this 
criterion – when taking into account the fact that the applicant had already 
been banned from the area concerned for overt use of hard drugs and that 
he totally ignored the ban, whereupon he was informed of the consequen- 
ces thereof and concluded that “in these circumstances, the Court finds 
that the restriction on the applicant’s freedom of movement cannot be 
regarded as disproportionate” (emphasis added)59. 
It is in the third element of the proportionality test that the required 
“fair balance”, as mentioned above, is clearly present. The restriction 
of the fundamental right caused by the measure imposed must stand in 
fair proportion to the importance of the legitimate aim pursued by the 
measure, which requires balancing means and ends60. Consequently, 
the proportionality test used in the ECofHR’s case law is often referred to 
as an “aims-means” balance. However, as is apparent from the above, the 
third element does not only require the means being balanced with the aim 
pursued but also the means being balanced with the consequences of the 
means for the individual, more specifically the impact caused on his or her 
fundamental rights and freedoms. The third element of the proportionality 
test compares the consequences of the measure for the individual’s rights 
(the “costs”) with the contribution of the measure to the attainment of the 
aim pursued (the “benefits”). In Landvreugd, for instance, the ECofHR took 
into account the consequences of the imposed area-based restriction on the 
applicant’s personal circumstances, when considering that the applicant did 
not live or work in the prohibited area and that certain provisions had been 
made so that he could enter the prohibited area to collect, amongst others, 
his mail61. It is thus more correct to say that the proportionality test at the 
56 Landvreugd, fn. 22 above, paras. 67–75 and Olivieira, fn. 22 above, paras. 60–66.
57 As already stated by Hidalgo in Hidalgo, “Liberty of Movement Within the Ter-
ritory of a State”, fn. 26 above, p. 622. See also Arai-Takahashi, “Proportionality”, fn. 54 
above, p. 454–455.
58 Hidalgo, “Liberty of Movement Within the Territory of a State”, fn. 26 above, 
p. 622. 
59 See Landvreugd, fn. 22 above, paras. 72 and 74. See, in the same sense, Olivieira, 
fn. 22 above, para. 65.
60 See, e.g. Gerards, EVRM: Algemene beginselen, fn. 28 above, p. 158 and 
Arai-Takahashi, “Proportionality”, fn. 54 above, p. 452.
61 Landvreugd, fn. 22 above, para. 72. See, in the same sense, Olivieira, fn. 22 
above, para. 65.
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European human rights level constitutes an “aims-means-consequences” 
balance instead of only an “aims-means” balance62.
However, national authorities must not only take into account the right 
to freedom of movement in Article 2 of the FAP or via the conditional 
rights in Articles 8, 10 and 11 of the ECHR, when assessing the proportion-
ality of freedom-restricting measures, such as area-based restrictions. If the 
area-based restriction is to be considered as a criminal charge or as civil for 
the purposes of Article 6 of the ECHR, it must also meet the requirements 
resulting from that Article. As mentioned above, these requirements pri-
marily constitute procedural protections, such as the right to a court with 
full jurisdiction. Article 6 does not comprise any substantive safeguards, let 
alone an independent proportionality test. 
Despite this absence of an independent proportionality test in Article 6 
of the ECHR, it appears from the ECofHR’s case law that this Article might 
yet have an effect, albeit indirectly, on the content of the proportionality 
principle. This indirect effect can be derived from the ECofHR’s case law 
with regard to the right to a court with full jurisdiction, which is a procedural 
safeguard resulting from Article 6(1) of the ECHR and which is applicable 
to both criminal and civil matters within the meaning of that Article. This 
right requires in general that the domestic court has the competence to 
examine the case on points of facts and law63. 
However, it appears from the ECofHR’s case law that it also demands 
the domestic court to be able to assess the proportionality of the measure 
imposed. For instance, the ECofHR referred to the proportionality principle 
when considering that the requirement of full jurisdiction includes “review 
of the facts and assessment of the proportionality between the fault and 
the sanction” (emphasis added)64 and the “competence to examine the case 
on points of fact and law as well as the power to assess the proportionality 
of the penalty to the misconduct” (emphasis added)65. In addition, it can be 
observed from the above case law that the requirement of full jurisdiction not 
only requires the power for the domestic court to assess the proportionality 
of the measure as such. This requirement also has implications for the 
62 As already stated by Barak in A. Barak, Proportionality, constitutional rights and 
their limitations, CUP 2012, p. 132.
63 See, e.g. Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 1, 
para. 51(b), as conrmed in, e.g. Terra Woningen BV v the Netherlands (1997) 24 
E.H.R.R. 456, para. 52 and Hummatov v Azerbaijan (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 36, para. 142. 
See also http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf (Accessed on 
27 July 2016), p. 21–23.
64 Albert and Le Compte v Belgium (1983) 5 E.H.R.R. 533, para. 36 (civil case). See, 
in the same sense, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 1, 
para. 51(b) (civil case); Diennet v France (1996) 21 E.H.R.R. 554, para. 34 (civil case) 
and Merigaud v France (App. No. 32976/04), decision of 24 September 2009, para. 69 
(criminal charge).
65 Hummatov v Azerbaijan (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 36, para. 142 (criminal charge). 
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content of the proportionality test. It can be tentatively stated that, as is 
apparent from the above case law, the requirement of full jurisdiction 
seems to demand, at least implicitly, the power for the domestic court to 
consider the proportionality between the individual’s misbehaviour, i.e. the 
facts, and the measure imposed66, thus implying a “means-facts” test.
It is important to note that this “means-facts” test would be applicable 
to both criminal and civil matters within the meaning of Article 6 of the 
ECHR. After all, this test can be derived from the ECofHR’s case law with 
regard to the right to a court with full jurisdiction, which is applicable to 
both criminal and civil cases. The ECofHR refers, albeit implicitly, to this 
“means-facts” test in both criminal and civil matters within the meaning of 
Article 6 of the ECHR67. 
Two remarks should be made here. First, the above analysis indicates 
that it is of great importance for national authorities to take into account 
the nature of the imposed area-based restriction and to ascertain whether 
it is to be regarded as civil and/or criminal within the meaning of Article 6 
of the ECHR. If this is the case, national authorities must also take into 
account the requirements of this Article, which presumably imply the 
application of a “means-facts” test. Second, national authorities must also 
be aware that, and regardless of the civil and/or criminal nature of the area-
based restriction imposed, the measure still involves a  restriction of the 
freedom of movement, as guaranteed in Article 2 of the FAP or via other 
fundamental rights, so that it must also meet the aforementioned “aims-
means-consequences” test. 
Therefore, it appears not to be an either-or story, in which national 
authorities must apply either the “aims-means-consequences” test or the 
criminal “means-facts” test. These tests are to be applied simultaneously, 
insofar as the freedom-restricting measure is to be considered as civil and/or 
criminal in view of Article 6 of the ECHR. Subsequently, it can be tentatively 
stated that, according to the ECofHR’s case law, national authorities are faced 
with not one but multiple proportionality tests that should be applied at the 
same time, given the fact that freedom-restricting measures may interfere 
with various fundamental rights. However, the ECofHR’s case law is still 
not explicit on this point and it remains indistinct as to whether national 
authorities must take into account the nature of the measure imposed in 
order to apply the “means-facts” test and whether this test is to be applied 
simultaneously with the “aims-means-consequences” test.
66 As already stated by M.L. van Emmerik, C.M. Saris, Evenredige bestuurlijke boe-
tes (Proportionate administrative nes), www.stibbe.com (Accessed on 27 July 2016), 
p. 135.
67 See, e.g. Albert and Le Compte v Belgium (1983) 5 E.H.R.R. 533, para. 36 (civil 
case); Diennet v France (1996) 21 E.H.R.R. 554, para. 34 (civil case); Merigaud v France 
(App. No. 32976/04), decision of 24 September 2009, para. 69 (criminal charge) and 
Hummatov v Azerbaijan (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 36, para. 142 (criminal charge). 
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We turn now to the proportionality principle in the Belgian Council 
of State’s case law, in an attempt to find leads for tackling the above lack of 
clarity at the European human rights level.
3.2. The proportionality principle in the Belgian Council of State’s case law
To be in accordance with Article 2 of the FAP, a  temporary prohibi-
tion of place must be proportionate, as discussed above. Although this 
is not expressly required by Article 134sexies of the NMA, it also stems 
from the proportionality principle as a  part of the Belgian unwritten 
general “principles of good administration”, which the executive must take 
into account. There is no relevant case law with regard to the temporary 
prohibition of place yet. However, it can be derived from the Council of 
State’s established case law concerning public order powers that the pro-
portionality principle must be assessed in a different way, depending on 
the legal classification of the measure imposed. It is thus necessary to make 
a  distinction between the proportionality test regarding police measures 
and the test as regards administrative sanctions. Since the prohibition of 
place is to be considered as a  police measure68, this article analyses the 
proportionality review for police measures. It proceeds with analysing 
the proportionality test concerning administrative sanctions.
3.2.1. Temporary prohibition of place as a police measure
In its case law, the Council of State emphasises the fact that the aim of 
police measures is to maintain public order. For this reason, a police meas-
ure is a preventive measure and not an administrative sanction, regardless 
of the fact that the measure may entail a disadvantage to the person con-
cerned69. The fact that the measure harms the individual does not per se 
turn it into a disproportionate one. What is decisive for the proportion-
ality test of police measures is thus not the harm caused to the individual, 
but what is necessary to achieve the pursued aim, i.e. maintaining public 
order70.
The Council of State usually examines two preliminary questions to con-
sider whether the imposed police measure is proportionate. It first analyses 
whether there is a specific need to maintain public order71. Subsequently, 
the Council of State examines whether the imposed measure is adapted to 
the specific need to maintain public order. Therefore, it mostly considers 
68 See supra.
69 RvS 15 May 2014, No. 227.421, para. 7 and RvS 29 July 2014, No. 228.130, para. 8.
70 RvS 15 May 2014, No. 227.421, paras. 15–16 and RvS 29 July 2014, No. 228.130, 
paras. 11–12.
71 See, e.g. RvS 26 June 2013, No. 224.084; RvS 13 December 2012, No. 221.751; 
RvS 2 December 2010, No. 209.414 and RvS 9 November 2009, No. 197.670.
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the following three questions, which are also present in the ECofHR’s case 
law, as discussed above72:
 – Is the measure necessary to counter the public order disturbance?
 – Is the measure useful to counter the public order disturbance?
 – Are the disadvantages for the individual caused by the measure pro-
portionate to the seriousness of the public order disturbance which 
the executive wishes to counter? This requires a  fair balance between 
the consequences of the measure for the individual and the benefits of it 
for the attainment of the pursued aim, i.e. the reduction in public order 
disturbance (also called “proportionality sensu stricto”).
Following these three steps, the Council of State balances the aim of 
maintaining public order and the measure used to pursue this aim (the po-
lice measure), thus balancing means and ends. In addition, it appears from 
the last element of the proportionality test above that the Council also takes 
into account the consequences of the measure for the individual, although it 
will not be a decisive element, as mentioned above. 
However, the Council of State does not always follow this three-step 
method. Especially with regard to restrictions of the right to free trade 
caused by a  local regulation or by an individual decision based on a  lo-
cal regulation, the Council seems to apply these three questions73. In cases 
not primarily concerning the freedom of trade, the Council of State lim-
its its review to the question whether the imposed measure “does not go 
further than necessary from a  viewpoint of maintaining public order”74. 
This means that the imposed measure may not cause more harm to the 
individual than necessary for the attainment of the pursued aim, thus also 
balancing the means and ends against the means and their consequences for 
the individual. 
For example, the Belgian prohibition of place is to be primarily under-
stood as a restriction of the right to freedom of movement and not the right 
to free trade. By consequence, it may be possible that the Council of State 
will not apply the three above-mentioned questions, but will only assess 
whether the imposed prohibition stands in fair proportion to the public 
order aim (i.e. tackling the public order disturbance in the area concerned), 
72 See, e.g. RvS 9 November 2009, No. 197.670; RvS 19 February 2002, No. 103.730; 
RvS 24 October 2000, No. 90.369 and RvS 7 December 1999, No. 83.940. For further 
discussion and references, see L. Todts, Het evenredigheidsbeginsel bij administratieve 
sancties en politiemaatregelen: de ene evenredigheid is de andere niet? (e principle of 
proportionality with regard to administrative sanctions and police measures: one propor-
tionality is not the other?) (2015) 4 Tijdschri voor Gemeenterecht 286, p. 289–290.
73 See e.g. RvS 9 November 2009, No. 197.670; RvS 19 February 2002, No. 103.730; 
RvS 4 October 2000, No. 90.369 and RvS 7 December 1999, No. 83.940.
74 RvS 29 July 2014, No. 228.130, para. 12 and RvS 15 May 2014, No. 227.421, 
para. 15.
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taking into account the consequences of the prohibition for the individual’s 
free movement, albeit not as a conclusive element. 
The above indicates that the proportionality test applied by the Council 
of State to police measures – and regardless of whether it applies the three-
step method or limits its analysis to the question of whether the measure 
does not go any further than necessary to maintain public order – clearly 
constitutes an “aims-means-consequences” test, which is also apparent 
in the ECofHR’s case law with regard to freedom-restricting public order 
powers (supra).
3.2.2. Temporary prohibition of place as an administrative sanction
It is conceivable that, in a specific case, the Council of State considers 
that the imposed prohibition of place is, given the specific circumstances of 
that case, imposed as an administrative sanction and not as a mere police 
measure75. Administrative sanctions are, as stated above, to be considered 
as a punishment imposed in order to hurt the offender for the infringement 
that he or she committed. This has important implications with regard to 
the proportionality test. In its case law, the Council of State has frequently 
confirmed that it is because of the fact that the imposed administrative 
sanction essentially constitutes a  punishment for the infringement of 
a  local regulation that the proportionality test may not be interpreted as 
whether or not the imposed measure goes beyond what is necessary to 
stop the public order disturbance, in contrast to the proportionality test 
for police measures. To be proportionate, the administrative sanction 
must stand in fair proportion to the severity of the facts committed, i.e. 
the infringement76. Thus, as an administrative sanction, the prohibition of 
place must be proportionate to the facts for which it is applied.
The interpretation of the proportionality test as being a  reasonable 
proportion between the imposed sanction and the facts, in other words 
a “means-facts” test, is not new. It is the traditional interpretation of the 
proportionality principle given by the Council of State, as developed in dis-
ciplinary law77. This interpretation in turn originates from the proportion-
ality test as it has been developed in domestic criminal law: the criminal 
sanction applied must stand in fair proportion to the severity of the facts, 
i.e. the criminal behaviour committed78. The interpretation of the propor-
tionality principle as regards administrative sanctions is thus more in line 
75 Supra.
76 RvS 8 May 2014, No. 227.331, para. 13.
77 When applying a disciplinary sanction, the disciplinary authority must strike 
a fair balance between the facts and the disciplinary sanction applied (see e.g. I. Opde-
beek, A. Coolsaet, Algemene beginselen van ambtenarentuchtrecht (General principles of 
civil servants disciplinary law), die Keure 2011, p. 86 and 214–234.
78 V. Vannes, Titre III – L’émergence de la proportionnalité dans le droit actuel [in:] 
V. Vannes (ed.), Le droit de grève. Concilier le droit de grève et les autres droits fondamen-
taux: recours au principe de proportionnalité?, Larcier 2014, p. 57–60.
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with the concept of proportionality in criminal matters than the adminis-
trative concept applied to police measures.
The above analysis reveals that the Council of State applies a different 
proportionality test depending on whether the measure imposed is 
preventive in nature or has a  more punitive purpose. It can be argued 
that this distinction is in line with Article 6 of the ECHR. After all, this 
Article also seems to require a  distinction between punitive measures 
(i.e. criminal charges) and those which are more preventive in nature and 
to apply the criminal “means-facts” to only criminal charges and not to 
preventive measures. As to the Belgian prohibition of place, for example, 
which is classified by the legislator as a  police measure, the Council of 
State (or a mayor when imposing it) will have to apply the “aims-means-
consequences” test, resulting from its merely preventive classification 
at national level, but also from its freedom-restricting nature in view of 
Article 2 of the FAP. However, it is not unconceivable that it is in reality 
imposed as an administrative sanction, or even as a criminal charge in line 
with the ECofHR’s case law, in both cases resulting in the application of the 
criminal “means-facts” test.
Two remarks are due here. First, assessing the proportionality of free-
dom-restricting public order powers, such as the Belgian prohibition of 
place, does not only seem to require a distinction between punitive meas-
ures and those which have a more preventive purpose. Another distinction 
has to be made in view of Article 6 of the ECHR, namely whether or not the 
measure concerned implies the determination of a civil right or obligation 
within the meaning of that Article. After all, as can be derived from UK 
case law as discussed above, such freedom-restricting measures are likely 
to be considered as civil for the purposes of Article 6 of the ECHR. So, 
even if the prohibition of place is in principle a preventive measure and not 
a punitive one (under domestic law or within the meaning of Article 6) and 
thus not leading to the application of the criminal “means-facts” test, this 
may still be the case, more specifically via its potential classification as civil 
in view of Article 6. In this case, the (preventive) prohibition of place must 
meet the criminal “means-facts” test as well since this test is also applicable 
to civil matters, as discussed above. 
Conversely, if the Belgian prohibition of place is in reality imposed as 
an administrative sanction, or even as a criminal charge in line with the 
ECofHR’s case law, the Council of State, or a mayor when imposing it, will 
have to apply the criminal “means-facts” test resulting from the domestic 
case law as well as, or at least implicitly, from the ECofHR’s case law with 
regard to Article 6 of the ECHR. This will, however, not suffice. Area-based 
restrictions, such as the prohibition of place, are also measures interfering 
with the right to free movement, so that the “aims-means-consequences” 
test resulting from Article 2 of the FAP or via other fundamental rights 
must also be applied at the same time.
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This brings me to the second remark. The above indicates that, as 
regards area-based restrictions, national authorities are not only faced 
with multiple proportionality tests at the European human rights level, 
stemming from the right to freedom of movement in Article 2 of the FAP 
or via other fundamental rights and as (likely) resulting from Article 6 of 
the ECHR. They are also confronted with various proportionality tests due 
to the multi-level legal framework in which they act, i.e. the domestic and 
European level.
We turn now to the proportionality principle in UK case law.
3.2.3. The proportionality principle in UK case law
When the State imposes a measure that restricts the individual in his or 
her Convention rights, for instance by imposing a direction to leave, this 
measure must meet the proportionality test adopted by the ECofHR and 
further developed by the UK courts79. Although Section 35 of the ACPA 
does not expressly refer to the proportionality principle, it does require 
the constable who imposes a  direction to leave to ascertain that giving 
the direction is “necessary for the purpose of removing or reducing the 
likelihood of the problematic behaviour”80. This indicates that the aim for 
which the direction is imposed will be of particular importance with regard 
to its proportionality. However, there is no relevant case law concerning the 
proportionality of the new direction to leave yet, so we must fall back upon 
the already existing UK case law with regard to the proportionality of other 
freedom-restricting measures imposed to maintain public order. 
In Gough, for instance, concerning a  football banning order on 
complaint, the domestic court applied the proportionality test used in 
de Freitas81 (the so-called “de Freitas”-test) to analyse the proportionality of 
the ban imposed, which comprises the following three questions82:
 – Does the measure have a legitimate aim, meaning that the aim pursued is 
sufficiently important to justify interference with a fundamental right?
 – Is the measure that has been designed to meet the aim rationally con-
nected to it? 
 – Does the measure go no further than is necessary to achieve the aim, 
which is generally understood as the requirement for the competent au-
thority to impose the measure which is the least intrusive for attaining 
the aim pursued83?
79 C. O’Cinneide, Human Rights and the UK Constitution [in:] J. Jowell, D. Oliver, 
C. O’Cinneide, e Changing Constitution, 8th ed., OUP 2015, p. 94.
80 S.35(3) of the ACPA.
81 De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture [1999] 1 A.C. 69.
82 Gough and Smith v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2002] Q.B. 1213, para. 63. 
See also Hickman, “e substance and structure of proportionality”, fn. 31 above, p. 701.
83 See e.g. Samaroo v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWCA 
Civ 1139, para. 20. See also Hickman, “e substance and structure of proportionality”, 
fn. 31 above, p. 701 and G. Pearson, Qualifying for Europe? e legitimacy of Football 
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The “de Freitas”-test was approved in the joint opinion of the Appellate 
Committee in the Huang case84 as well as by the House of Lords in other 
cases85. As a  result, this test must be regarded as the firmly established 
proportionality test in UK domestic law, at least in respect of the Convention 
rights86. However, the following question was added in Huang87:
 – Does the measure strike a fair balance between competing interests, i.e. 
the individual’s rights and the interests of the community? This means 
that the impact of the measure on the individual’s rights must stand in 
fair proportion to the benefits of the measure in the light of the pursued 
aim (also called “proportionality sensu stricto”).
Although the content of the proportionality principle has not always 
been consistent, it now seems generally accepted that the proportionality 
test in UK domestic law comprises the above four questions88. Therefore, 
this test will probably be the one that must be taken into account when 
assessing the proportionality of the order to leave so that it complies with 
the Convention rights.
It is nevertheless sometimes difficult in practice to distinguish the 
seemingly independent criteria of the domestic proportionality test 
from one another89. Consequently, as articulated by Gordon, the entire 
proportionality review de facto requires no more than a  “very general 
scrutiny of means and ends”90, a balance to which also Section 35(3) of the 
ACPA expressly refers, as mentioned above. However, it is important to 
point out that the fourth criterion of the above-mentioned proportionality 
test also requires taking into account the impact of the adopted measure 
Banning Orders ‘on Complaint’ under the principle of proportionality (2005) 3 ESLJ 1, 
p. 4. Note, however, that imposing the least intrusive measure is not always required in 
the ECofHR’s case law, as mentioned above.
84 Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11; [2007] 
2 A.C. 167, para. 19 (joint opinion).
85 Daly v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 
2 A.C. 532, para. 27 (Lord Steyn); R v Shayler [2002] UKHL 11; [2003] 1 A.C. 247, para. 61 
(Lord Hope of Craighead); A & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 
UKHL 56; [2005] 2 A.C. 68, para. 30 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill).
86 Hickman, “e substance and structure of proportionality”, fn. 31 above, p. 701.
87 Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11; [2007] 
2 A.C. 167. See also Hickman, “e substance and structure of proportionality”, fn. 31 
above, p. 713.
88 See e.g. Nicklinson [2014] UKSC 38; [2015] A.C. 657,  para. 80; Bank Mellat 
v HM Treasury [2013] UKSC 39; [2013] H.R.L.R. 30, para. 20 and R (Aguilar Quila) 
v e Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 1 A.C. 621, para. 45. See also 
e.g. Hickman, “e substance and structure of proportionality”, fn. 31 above, p. 713 and 
A.D.P. Brady, Proportionality and Deference…, p. 7.
89 As also stated by Lord Sumption in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2013] UKSC 39; 
[2013] H.R.L.R. 30, para. 20. See also R. Gordon QC, Two dogmas of Proportionality 
(2011) 16(3) J.R. 182, 184, para. 14.
90 R. Gordon QC, Two dogmas of Proportionality…
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for the individual’s rights. Therefore, as to the UK direction to leave, UK 
courts, as well as the constable in uniform who imposes this direction, 
must not only balance the direction and the pursued aim of maintaining 
public order. They must also take into account the consequences of the 
direction for the individual’s fundamental rights, more specifically the right 
to freedom of movement as guaranteed via the Convention rights. Hence, 
the UK proportionality principle primarily comprises an “aims-means-
consequences” test, which is also apparent in the ECofHR’s case law, as 
discussed above. 
However, it is not because the above “aims-means-consequences” test 
is to be considered as the established domestic proportionality test, or at 
least with regard to the Convention rights, and that it is the test to which 
section 35(2) of the ACPA refers, albeit partly, that this is the only test that is 
applicable to the direction to leave. After all, UK courts and the competent 
constable must also take into account the requirements resulting from 
Article 6 of the ECHR, more specifically the required distinction between 
criminal and non-criminal matters. This distinction is increasingly taken 
into account by UK courts, as discussed above. However, up until now, this 
distinction has been primarily made with regard to the applicable procedural 
safeguards guaranteed in Article 6 of the ECHR91 but not as regards the 
different content of the proportionality principle, which presumably results 
from that Article as well. Thus, UK courts do not appear to make a similar 
distinction as that present in the Belgian Council of State’s case law, with 
regard to the applicable proportionality test in the light of Article 6. They 
seem to apply only the established “aims-means-consequences” test, at least 
in respect of the Convention rights. 
In my opinion, though, it might be possible that, to be in accordance 
with Article 6 of the ECHR, UK courts must take into account the nature 
of the measure. It can be argued that they should make a similar distinction 
as the one present in the Belgian Council of State’s case law and distinguish 
between the applicable proportionality test to punitive measures and the 
test applicable to preventive measures. If the measure is to be considered 
as punitive within the meaning of Article 6 of the ECHR (i.e. a criminal 
charge), it appears from the ECofHR’s case law that it must meet the 
criminal “means-facts” test, which is not applicable to mere preventive 
measures. As to the UK direction to leave, it is primarily regarded as 
a  “civil”, i.e. non-criminal measure under UK domestic law, so that the 
criminal “means-fact” test is not applicable. However, this does not prevent 
UK courts from deciding in a particular case that the direction to leave is in 
reality imposed as a criminal charge within the meaning of Article 6 of the 
91 See e.g. Gough and Smith v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2002] Q.B. 1213, pa-
ras. 89–90 (criminal standard of proof) and Secretary of State for the Home Department 
v MB [2007] UKHL 46, paras. 23–24 (right to a fair hearing).
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ECHR, as discussed above. If this is the case, the imposed direction to leave 
should meet the criminal “means-facts” test.
Moreover, the distinction between criminal and non-criminal measures 
is not the only distinction which UK courts, as well as the constable who 
imposes the direction to leave, must take into account. The ECofHR’s 
case law also distinguishes between civil and non-civil matters in view of 
Article 6 of the ECHR. As discussed above, the classification as civil within 
the meaning of Article 6 has been already confirmed in UK case law with 
regard to certain freedom-restricting public order powers. Given the fact 
the direction to leave is also a public order power restricting the individual 
in his or her free movement, it is not unconceivable that it is to be regarded 
as civil in view of Article 6. If so, national authorities may be required to 
apply the criminal “means-facts” test as well, since this test is also applicable 
to civil matters.
As a result, with regard to the UK direction to leave, it does not suffice 
that national authorities take into account its freedom-restricting nature 
and apply the established “aims-means-consequences” test, resulting from 
the ECofHR’s case law and as further developed by UK courts. They must 
also take into account the civil and/or criminal nature of the direction 
imposed for the purposes of Article 6 of the ECHR, in order to determine 
whether the criminal “means-facts” test is also applicable, in addition to 
the established proportionality test at the domestic level. As a  result, if 
the direction to leave is civil and/or criminal in view of Article 6, national 
authorities will have to take into account multiple proportionality tests 
and thus criteria at the same time, namely the established “aims-means-
consequences” test as well as the criminal “means-facts” test.
4. Concluding remarks
This contribution aimed to provide a  first exploratory analysis of the 
criteria that national authorities have to take into account when considering 
the proportionality of public order measures restricting the individual’s 
right to freedom of movement within the territory of a  particular State, 
such as area-based restrictions.
To be compliant with the right to freedom of movement, as guaranteed 
in Article 2 of the FAP or via other fundamental rights, area-based restric-
tions must stand in fair proportion to the public order aim pursued and its 
consequences for the individual’s free movement (the “aims-means-conse-
quences” test). Additionally, if the area-based restriction is to be regarded 
as civil and/or criminal within the meaning of Article 6 of the ECHR, it ap-
pears at least implicitly from the ECofHR’s case law with regard to the right 
to a court with full jurisdiction that it must also stand in fair proportion to 
the individual’s misbehaviour, i.e. the facts (the “means-facts” test). This 
152
The Legitimacy of Area-Based Restrictions to Maintain Public Order… RAP 2017 (3)
would in turn imply that there are multiple proportionality tests and thus 
different criteria stemming from the European human rights level.
Nevertheless, the ECofHR’s case law is still not explicit on this point. 
Some inspiration can be found at national level. The Belgian Council of 
State takes into account the nature of the measure imposed to appropriately 
determine the applicable proportionality test. It applies the criminal 
“means-facts” test to only punitive measures, whereas an “aims-means-
consequences” test, similar to the one at European level, is applied to 
those that are rather preventive in nature. I argue that this appears to be 
in line with Article 6 of the ECHR and that national authorities should 
take into account the (non-)punitive nature of the measure to appropriately 
determine the applicable proportionality test. Additionally, as it appears 
from UK case law, national authorities should also be aware that freedom-
restricting public order powers, such as area-based restrictions, are likely 
to be considered as (also) civil within the meaning of Article 6. In this 
case, the criminal “means-facts” test is applicable as well, in addition to the 
domestic proportionality test. 
This, in turn, entails that national authorities are not just faced with 
various proportionality tests and thus different criteria to be applied 
resulting from European level, as area-based restrictions may not only 
interfere with the right to free movement in Article 2 of the FAP or via 
other fundamental rights, but also with Article 6 of the ECHR. National 
authorities are also confronted with multiple proportionality tests and thus 
criteria that they have to apply, due to the multi-level legal framework in 
which they act, i.e. the national level and the European level.
As a  result, additional research is necessary to further clarify the 
different proportionality tests and their subsequent criteria, both from 
national and European levels, in order to examine whether and to what 
extent these multiple tests are similar or should be similar. This would 
lead to a  clearer proportionality review of freedom-restricting measures 
imposed to maintain public order. A clearer proportionality review in turn 
fosters a more clear and general assessment framework for such freedom-
restricting public order powers, which is indispensable for striking a good 
balance between the need to maintain public order and our fundamental 
rights and freedoms, especially the right to freedom of movement.
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Abstract
is contribution aims to provide a rst exploratory analysis of the criteria that must 
be taken into account by national authorities when considering the proportionality 
of public order measures restricting the individual’s fundamental right to freedom of 
movement, such as area-based restrictions. e content of the proportionality principle 
as regards area-based restrictions is not always clear, in particular at European human 
rights level, while it is an important condition that these restrictions be compatible with 
the right to freedom of movement. To that end, this article rst gives a brief overview of 
the content of this principle at European level. In order to nd some inspiration, it then 
compares it with the interpretation of this principle at national level, more specically 
Belgium and the United Kingdom, where new forms of area-based restrictions have 
been introduced recently. e case law of the Belgian Council of State is an interesting 
case to examine since the Council applies a dierent proportionality test depending 
on the legal classication of the measure imposed. e contribution proceeds with an 
analysis of the proportionality principle in the UK case law, where it is a relative new-
comer used instead of the traditional “Wednesbury unreasonableness” test in cases that 
fall under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Keywords: area-based restrictions, proportionality principle, public order
Legitymacja ograniczeń terytorialnych 
wydanych w celu utrzymania porządku publicznego: 
wypełnienie treścią zasady proporcjonalności z europejskiej perspektywy prawnej 
Streszczenie
Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu zaproponowanie pierwszej analizy badawczej kryteriów, 
jakie muszą być uwzględnione przez organy krajowe przy rozpatrywaniu przez nie 
proporcjonalności środków w zakresie porządku publicznego ograniczających podsta-
wowe prawo jednostki do swobodnego przemieszczania się, takich jak ograniczenia 
terytorialne. Treść zasady proporcjonalności w zakresie ograniczeń terytorialnych nie 
zawsze jest jasna, zwłaszcza w obszarze praw człowieka w Europie, zaś istotnym wa-
runkiem jest zgodność przedmiotowych ograniczeń z prawem swobodnego przemiesz-
czania się. W związku z powyższym niniejszy artykuł najpierw oferuje zwięzły prze-
gląd treści przywołanej zasady w wymiarze europejskim. W poszukiwaniu inspiracji 
autorka następnie zestawia ją z wykładnią przedmiotowej zasady na gruncie krajowym, 
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a  konkretnie w  Belgii oraz Zjednoczonym Królestwie, gdzie ostatnio wprowadzono 
nowe formy ograniczeń terytorialnych. Ciekawy przypadek stanowi orzecznictwo bel-
gijskiej Rady Stanu, która stosuje inny test proporcjonalności w zależności od klasy-
kacji prawnej nałożonego środka. W ostatniej części artykułu zaprezentowano analizę 
zasady proporcjonalności w  orzecznictwie brytyjskim, gdzie od niedawna zastępuje 
ona „test Wednesbury w zakresie nieracjonalności” w sprawach podlegających Euro-
pejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka. 
Słowa kluczowe: ograniczenia terytorialne, zasada proporcjonalności, porządek 
publiczny
